

VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0035/01 0431859
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121859Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6213
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISI/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000035

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR HAYES
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2013
TAGS: [KCFE](#) [OSCE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#)
SUBJECT: EURO SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: ALLIES AT OSCE STAND
UNITED IN MEETING WITH RUSSIA

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C/REL NATO) Summary. The NATO Caucus of the OSCCE on February 10 agreed that Allies attending Russian Chief of Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov's meeting would attend in listening mode only, maintain a united front, and report back to all Allies. Allies also agreed to consolidate questions reflecting their shared position in advance of Russian DFM Grushko's presentation at the February 18 joint FSC-PC on a new European security architecture.

¶2. (SB) At the February 12 informal meeting, Ulyanov stressed his desire for an open, inclusive dialogue on the structure and content of the arms control portion of a hypothetical new European security arrangement. Ulyanov proposed five principles/criteria for any new arms control arrangement--balance/reciprocity, military significance, cost effectiveness long-term impact, verifiability and adaptability. Allies were in marked unity. In responding that they were in a listening mode, Allies also emphasized that any discussion on a new arrangement should take a comprehensive approach to security, include all participating States and build on the existing security acquis, including the CFE Treaty. They also made clear that the meeting was a one-time event. End summary.

- - - - -
NATO Caucus Agrees to Talk with Ulyanov
- - - - -

¶3. (C/REL NATO) The NATO Caucus met on February 11 to coordinate NATO approaches to Russian Chief of Arms Control Ulyanov's informal meeting on European Security, scheduled for February 12, and Russian DFM Grushko's presentation on European Security Architecture at the February 18 OSCE joint FSC-PC meeting. Providing a lead-in to discussion among Allies on Ulyanov's meeting, the UK reported that Russian DFM Antonov had misrepresented to some Allies the UK position from bilateral recent talks in Moscow, claiming that the UK raised the concept of a "ginger group," which included some Allies and excluded others. The UK saw this as another clear attempt by Russia to play Allies off against each other, reassured Allies that the UK made no such proposal, and cautioned Allies to keep this in mind when discussing Ulyanov's meeting.

¶4. (C/REL NATO) The roll call of Allies Ulyanov invited to his meeting included Germany, the UK, the U.S., France, Turkey, Spain, Canada, Greece, and the Czech Republic. Germany favored dialogue, while most invitees cautioned that Allies should remain in the listening mode. The Netherlands, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Luxembourg expressed concern that Ulyanov was attempting to dictate the pace and scope of discussions, while Slovenia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Belgium requested that attendees report back on the results. The U.S. Charge (Scott) noted U.S. willingness to attend the meeting in order to support dialogue, but added that the U.S. could gladly defer if there was a consensus that Allies should not attend. Concern over implicitly relinquishing control over future discussion to Russia was balanced against the need to demonstrate a willingness to engage. Allies finally agreed that invitees could attend Ulyanov's informal meeting, provided they remain in a listening mode, clearly indicate to Ulyanov that his informal sub-group approach is a one-off event that is not acceptable for future discussions, and that attendees back-brief all Allies on the results of the meeting at the next caucus.

- - - - -
Grushko--Allies to Consolidate Questions on Euro Security
- - - - -

¶5. (SBU) The remainder of the caucus focused on coordinating an Allied response to the February 18 presentation on European Security Architecture by Russian DFM Grushko. Greece, as the CiO, outlined its response, which it said would draw from the NAC communique last fall and the Helsinki Ministerial. The Czech Republic outlined a preliminary EU

position consisting of five main points that closely mirrored the CiO position. The U.S. noted that both approaches closely mirrored its response: existing institutions working well, the need for better implementation, Vienna/OSCE is the forum, comprehensive approach to security essential-- with one essential exception of the need for a strong transatlantic link. (Note. Greece later suggested it might add that to their remarks as CiO. End note.) France, Turkey, the UK and the Czech Republic reported similar lines of reasoning, with the latter noting that Prague had forwarded three pages of questions for use at the joint meeting. Scott proposed that Allies coordinate their questions so as to efficiently use the limited time for Q and A. Turkey, which will chair the next JCG-T and NATO Mini-Caucus, agreed to collate Allied questions, which it will distribute for deconfliction at the Mini-Caucus on February 16.

- - - - -
Ulyanov Searching for Ideas on New Arms Control Treaty
- - - - -

¶6. (SBU) During Russia's meeting on European security, Ulyanov initiated discussion by acknowledging that the process should be inclusive and that the invitee list for the first meeting was driven by practical limitations of space. He asked participants to inform all colleagues that they are invited to participate, and said that for the next meeting he will reserve one of the larger halls.

¶7. (SBU) Ulyanov stressed that he had not received instructions from Moscow and that he wanted an open-ended informal dialogue with no strings attached. He wanted partners' questions and comments to help frame Russia's vision. His purpose was to discuss a hypothetical arms control component to a hypothetical broader security treaty. He said Russia does not envision a European treaty substituting for existing treaties and agreements, although he claimed that these were no longer working. He referenced a set of principles that ought to shape and discussion of a new arms control arrangement--balance/reciprocity, military significance, cost effectiveness long-term impact, verifiability and adaptability.

- - - - -
Ulyanov: "Existing Security Acquis Not Working."

- - - - -
¶18. (SBU) Ulyanov said he was looking at ways to link existing security structures, to cover areas where those structures do not overlap, and to explore measures that can assist current international institutions to interact and coordinate more effectively. While Ulyanov agreed that it might be useful to reaffirm the existing arms control *acquis*, uncertainty over the future of CFE suggested a more general endorsement would be appropriate. If the U.S. and Allies begin serious negotiations on the parallel action package, this could influence the scope of the endorsement. "The ball is in your court," he said.

- - - - -
Allies Remain United and Cautious
- - - - -

¶19. (SBU) Allies spoke with marked unity in response to Ulyanov's invitation. With the possible exception of Spain, almost all stressed the importance of the timing of any discussion of a new European security arrangement; the need to include all 56 participating States in a transparent discussion; the need to consider all aspects or dimensions of security, including the human and economic/environmental as well as the political-military; and the need to build on the existing security *acquis* in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, the Vienna Document, and other OSCE documents. While a few delegations actually asked open-ended questions, e.g., Greece wanted to know how the basic principles of arms control Ulyanov posed would relate to the existing arms control *acquis* and Turkey asked if the principles would extend to disarmament, most made statements

in response to Ulyanov's plea for engagement and dialogue on a "hypothetical new European security treaty."

¶10. (SBU) Ulyanov acknowledged that some dels may be uncomfortable with the idea of discussing concrete arms control issues in Vienna when their capitals have yet to decide whether they want to support the broader Medvedev proposal. He defended the idea of working on concrete arms control by using the chicken and egg analogy; i.e., dialogue on AC could help frame the larger picture and may contribute to a more favorable political climate. As to scope, Ulyanov acknowledged the desire of many delegations to base any new security arrangement on multi-dimensional security, but questioned whether such a comprehensive approach was practical for one document.

- - - - -
Caution Against Similar Meetings in the Future
- - - - -

¶11. (SBU) The U.S. and Germany recommended against holding similar meetings in the near future. There were simply too many unknowns. Delegations, as well as their capitals, needed to better understand what Russia was proposing. The U.S. added that it did not fully understand the Russian proposal but would listen carefully to Ulyanov's ideas and those of DFM Grushko when he addressed the OSCE on February 18. The UK, the U.S., Germany and Turkey emphasized the need to avoid a separate discussion of arms control: any new security arrangement would have to include the human and economic dimensions and reflect already agreed fundamentals as reflected in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

¶12. (SBU) Canada obtained confirmation from Ulyanov that any new arrangement would include the entire Euro-Atlantic area, including the U.S. and Canada. Finland and the Czech Republic repeated calls for inclusiveness at 56 in the discussion. Switzerland noted that any discussion could not begin with a blank page but had to reflect the existing *acquis* and current conditions.

¶13. (SBU) Spain agreed that dialogue was inherently valuable, but then offered that it was prepared to find a way to

"operationalize" ideas in an "attempt to go farther." Ulyanov did not directly respond to this offer.

¶14. (SBU) Belarus, not surprisingly, endorsed the "Medvedev proposals" and agreed with Ulyanov that the initial focus of political-military experts in Vienna should be, because of their expertise, on the political-military dimension. It was also the most crucial issue.

¶15. (SBU) Ulyanov said emphasized that event the current dialogue has been useful, that he had a lot to mull over and report to Moscow, and that he would take all comments and questions into consideration and come up with a more comprehensive text.

¶16. (SBU) After the meeting, the U.S. quietly reiterated to Ulyanov that should not convene another meeting. It was far too early to even think of convening arms control experts to work on a portion of a larger, undefined instrument.

SCOTT